The question of which of the two main candidates in U.S. presidential elections is better for Arab interests has been a perennial concern. This is understandable, given that the United States has been the world's most powerful nation since Israel's establishment and remains its primary supporter. Consequently, the presence of a president who is either heavily biased toward Israel or relatively less so can significantly impact Arab interests, particularly regarding the Palestinian issue.
While the Palestinian cause is not the sole factor in Arab-American relations, it consistently takes precedence when considering which American presidential candidate is preferable. Other aspects of the relationship, such as trade, cultural exchange, and development patterns, do not carry the same level of polarization that typically surrounds the Palestinian issue. This focus on the Palestinian cause reflects its central importance in shaping Arab perceptions of U.S. presidential candidates and their potential impact on regional interests.
This article aims to provide an objective analysis within the constraints of political neutrality. To achieve this, two key observations will be explored. First, we will examine lessons from past experiences, focusing on how the positions of American presidents toward Israel have potentially diverged based on their party affiliations. Second, we will consider the unique aspects of the current electoral race as it approaches its conclusion. Through these two lenses, we will synthesize a comprehensive analytical summary at the end of this opinion piece.
Lessons from Past Experiences
From a historical perspective, it is evident that U.S. bias toward Israel transcends partisan lines, persisting regardless of the political affiliation of American presidents. While some argue that Republican presidents are generally more pro-Israel, the historical exception of former Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower challenges this notion. As the 34th President of the United States from 1953 to 1961, Eisenhower insisted on Israel's withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza following the failed Tripartite Aggression against Egypt, which involved collusion with Britain and France.
Other Republican U.S. presidents have also taken unconventional positions. Former President George H.W. Bush, for instance, withheld $10 billion in loan guarantees requested by Israel to accommodate Soviet Jewish immigration, stating he would not grant these guarantees unless Israel froze settlement construction in territories occupied during the 1967 war. Similarly, the roadmap presented by former President George W. Bush in 2003 led to UN Security Council Resolution 1515, which called for the establishment of a Palestinian state by 2005. These actions mirror positive steps taken by Democratic presidents like John F. Kennedy (1961-1963), Jimmy Carter (1977-1981), and Barack Obama (2009-2016) from an Arab perspective.
A closer examination of successive U.S. presidents' positions, regardless of party affiliation, reveals two clear facts. Firstly, the prevailing model is one of unwavering support for Israel, manifesting as absolute diplomatic, economic, and military backing. Secondly, what has been termed "positive positions" from both Democratic and Republican presidents have often been ineffective or short-lived. For example, John F. Kennedy's dialogues with former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict yielded no results due to Kennedy's assassination. George H.W. Bush reversed his decision to suspend loan guarantees to Israel in 1991 just a year after Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir offered a limited reduction in settlement construction. In some cases, these positive positions were not implemented, as with UN Security Council Resolution 1515, or occurred too late, such as the abstentions by the Carter and Obama administrations on two Security Council resolutions against Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank at the end of their tenures. The current Biden administration's adoption of a two-state solution following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, without substantive efforts to implement it, further illustrates this pattern.
The conclusion, therefore, is that past experiences indicate a persistent bias among American presidents, regardless of their party affiliations. Eisenhower's stance in 1957 stands out as a rare exception. Furthermore, all positions that might represent a partial deviation from this bias have ultimately amounted to little, as noted above. Consequently, many believe that debating preferences between American presidential candidates is futile, as the outcome remains largely unchanged from the perspective of Arab interests.
However, some argue that there is a strong justification for raising this question specifically in the upcoming November elections. This is primarily because Donald Trump's support for Israel during his first term exceeded the usual boundaries of American policy, which leads us to the second observation.
The Specificity of the 2024 Elections
While there is a general consensus that the differences in American presidents' policies toward Arab issues, particularly the Palestinian question, do not warrant extensive debate over preferring Democratic or Republican candidates for Arab interests, some argue this debate is justified for the upcoming November 5, 2024 presidential elections. This perspective stems from the fact that Trump isn't just another presidential candidate; he is a former president who took unprecedented steps favoring Israel, actions no previous American president had dared to undertake.
The U.S. Congress passed the Jerusalem Embassy Act in 1995, which called for recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital and relocating the U.S. Embassy there within five years. Despite this, three successive presidents—Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama—each serving two terms, refrained from implementing this law. They maintained the long-standing American policy that Jerusalem's future shouldn't be subject to unilateral actions, especially given the U.S. opposition to Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem following the 1967 Six-Day War.
Trump, however, broke with this tradition. Less than a year into his presidency, on December 6, 2017, he recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital and moved the U.S. embassy there by May 2018. He did not stop there. In March 2019, Trump recognized Israel's annexation of the occupied Golan Heights, and in November of the same year, Washington declared that it no longer considered West Bank settlements a violation of international law. These actions marked a significant departure from the policies of all previous American administrations regarding Arab territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 war.
Trump's bias towards Israel culminated in 2020 with the announcement of his plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, dubbed the "Deal of the Century."
Trump continues his presidential campaign for the November 2024 elections by staunchly advocating for Israel, emphasizing the need to end the war in Gaza in a manner that allows Israel to achieve its objectives. He builds a significant part of his campaign against his opponent, Kamala Harris, on the assertion that she harbors animosity towards Israel, warning that the country would cease to exist within two years if she became president. Inadvertently, Trump conveys a grave insult to Israel, implying that its survival hinges on the policies of the American president.
Some argue that, based on Trump's previous experience during his first term and his current campaign direction, there is no comparison from the perspective of Arab interests between him and the Democratic candidate. Harris acknowledges the two-state solution and seeks to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza and a prisoner exchange. Her advisor even promises a review of American policy toward Israel if she wins the race to the White House.
However, critics counter this viewpoint by drawing from the past experience of American policy toward Israel since its inception. They argue that the bias toward Israel is fundamental, and all moderate positions attributed to the Democrats have either been short-lived, occurred only at the last moment, or, most importantly, lacked real pressure on Tel Aviv to translate reasonable positions into concrete realities on the ground.
This pattern is clearly evident in current events. Despite countless statements made by President Biden, his secretaries of state and defense, and members of his presidential team regarding the two-state solution, ceasefire, rejection of displacement, and the need to deliver aid to Gaza, these declarations have not resulted in any positive developments on the ground.
Some go further, accusing the current American administration of colluding with Israel to create the illusion of progress toward halting the war. This is evidenced by overly optimistic statements about the imminent reach of a ceasefire agreement, allegedly aimed at "sedating" the Palestinian and Arab parties to give Israel the opportunity to fulfill its mission and achieve its war goals.
Consequently, proponents of this perspective argue that having a president with candid pro-Israel positions may actually be better for Arab interests. They contend that these clear stances might stimulate the necessary response to defend Arab interests, as opposed to the perceived ineffectual moderation of the Democratic approach.
In summary, the previous analysis suggests that the question this article initially sought to answer may be moot. The unwavering American bias toward Israel is a reality that transcends party lines and the personal characteristics of presidents who have occupied the White House. This does not mean there are no differences among them; however, these variations have never led to a significant positive shift in Arab interests.
Even when these differences resulted in clear setbacks for Arab interests, as seen during Trump's presidency, the roots of these setbacks are deeply embedded in the Palestinian and Arab situations that allowed for such outcomes. Therefore, the more pertinent question to pose is not which candidate in the American presidential elections is better for Arab interests, but rather what Arabs should do to influence American decisions regarding their concerns.
The avenues and tools for action in this direction are diverse and promising, especially following the shifts that have occurred in certain segments of American public opinion regarding Israeli policy in Gaza and the West Bank. This evolving landscape presents new opportunities for engagement and influence. However, exploring these possibilities is a topic for another discussion.
